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STATE WIDE STUDIES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE*
WALTER WHEELER COOK**

Toward the close of the sixteenth century there occurred
an exceeding important event in the history of human thought.
A young man still in his twenties, by the name of Galileo Galilei,
carried to the top of the Leaning Tower of Pisa a large cannon
ball and a smaller one and dropped them simultaneously over
the edge of the tower. They reached the ground simultaneously
or so nearly so that the difference was negligible. From the
astonished and antagonistic crowd which had gathered, angry
mutterings arose and Galileo was charged with sorcery. This
dissatisfaction of the onlookers had several sources. One was
that the result violated the "common sense" conclusion that a
heavy weight must necessarily fall more rapidly than a lighter
one-witness that a piece of paper flutters to the ground more
slowly than a stone drops. This "common sense" view had been
taken by Aristotle and had been treated as correct ever since.
Now, to question the authority of Aristotle in the sixteenth
century was scientific and philosophical heresy and not to be
tolerated. And here we come to the deeper significance of the
disagreement between Galileo and his contemporaries. His idea
was that the right way to find out the law governing the fall
of bodies was to observe how bodies fall under different circumstances, whereas most of his contemporaries thought that the
right way was to read authoritative works of Greek philosophers,
more particularly those of Aristotle. Now this difference is
a fundamental one, and marks the distinction between the modern scientist and those who preceded him. We are today, of
course, all familiar with the idea which underlay Galileo's simple
experiment, namely, that the way to find out how things act is
to observe them in action rather than to speculate about them
or to rely blindly upon so-called "common sense" or the writings
of supposed authorities. Perhaps, however, not all of us fully
appreciate how much a part of modern science is in conflict
with the conclusions of so-called "common sense." Indeed, it
* An address delivered before the Indiana State Bar Association at Lafayette, Indiana, July 10, 1931.
** Of the Institute of Law of the Johns Hopkins University.
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is probable that only the experts in the fields of physics, chemistry and astronomy fully realize this conflict between the everyday view of the ordinary man and the technical outlook of
modern science. "Common sense" tells man that the earth is
flat; science that it is round; "common sense" tells him that
the earth is at rest and the sun moves; modern science, that both
statements are true for some purposes but not for others.
"Common sense" tells him that this floor on which I am standing
is solid; modern science, that it is largely empty space, filled
by small particles moving about with extraordinary velocity,
and that it is the impact of these particles on the soles of his
shoes which keeps him from falling.
An eminent scientist recently put the matter as follows:
"The learned physicist and the man in the street were standing together on the threshold about to enter a room.
"The man in the street moved forward without trouble,
planted his foot on a solid unyielding plank at rest before him,
and entered.
"The physicist was faced with an intricate problem. To
make any movement he must shove against the atmosphere,
which presses with a force of fourteen pounds on every square
inch of his body. He must land on a plank travelling at twenty
miles a second round the sun-a fraction of a second earlier
or later the plank would be miles away from the chosen spot.
He must do this whilst hanging from a round planet head
outward into space, and with a wind of ether blowing at no
one knows how many miles a second through every interstice
of his body. He reflects too that the plank is not what it appears
to be-a continuous support for his weight. The plank is mostly
emptiness; very sparsely scattered in that emptiness are myriads
of electric charges dashing about at great speeds but occupying
at any moment less than a billionth part of the volume which the
plank seems to fill continuously. It is like stepping on a swarm
of flies. Will he not slip through? No, if he makes the venture,
he falls for an instant till an electron hits him and gives him
a boost up again; he falls again, and is knocked upwards by
another electron; and so on. The net result is that he neither
slips through the swarm nor is bombarded up to the ceiling,
but is kept about steady in this shuttlecock fashion. Or rather,
it is not certain but highly probable that he remains steady;
and if, unfortunately, he should sink through the floor or hit
the ceiling, the occurrence would not be a violation of the laws

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

of nature but a rare coincidence." (From "Science, Religion
and Reality," by A. S. Eddington.)
It is an interesting fact that only recently have we begun
to attempt to apply the methods and point of view of modern
science to the study of man himself and of his relation to his
fellow-men. Only within the past generation has psychology
set itself up as an experimental science and begun to divorce
itself from speculative philosophy, and only still more recently
have real attempts been made to apply a truly scientific method
to the study of man in his relation to his fellowmen. So recent,
indeed, is the latter development that even today the words
sociology or social science are regarded by many laymen as
merely new-fangled names for Socialism or something worse
-a conclusion perhaps justified by the conduct of many who
call themselves sociologists or social scientists but who in truth
persist in formulating speculative theories without adequate
supporting facts.
This tendency of the human mind to rely upon "fundamental
principles," to assert the existence of fixed and immutable principles which have somehow been discovered by human beings,
upon the basis of which by mere reasoning man can reach
solutions of his problems, seems to be the greater the more complex the situation. If the problem is one of physical science or
engineering-say the ventilation of a new type of tunnel under
the Hudson River-the experts realize that, the problem being
novel, additional facts may need to be gathered, and so perhaps
they build a small experimental tunnel and observe how an
experimental system of ventilation works. In other words, they
rely upon the scientific method of trial and error. If, however,
the problem is one in economics, government, or law, where
the number and complexity of the factors to be considered are
almost infinitely greater, the tendency of the average man is
to fall back upon his stock of "fundamental principles," and
to try to solve his problems by mere reasoning. It is perhaps
for this reason more than any other that only within the most
recent years it has been suggested that it may well be that
the same methods of careful study and observation of actual
events which have been so fruitful in other fields will yield
worthwhile results if applied to our legal system. In what
follows we shall attempt to discover some of the things that
can be said in support of such a proposition. If we assume-
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as I think we must-that human law is a device which society
uses to regulate human conduct, to promote those types of
conduct deemed desirable and to prevent those deemed undesirable, it would seem well worth our while to make an effort to
find out how much of our legal system really does accomplish
the purpose for which it is supposed to exist. Obviously, this
will be no easy task and one which will never be finished, for
in a sense we shall be studying a moving picture filled with
innumerable details. Moreover, we shall be dealing with matters which frequently touch the quick of human emotion and
about which it is therefore difficult to think or write with the
detached and dispassionate attitude of the physical scientist.
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties in the way, the
authorities of The Johns Hopkins University have concluded
that the attempt shall be made, and the Institute of Law of the
Johns Hopkins has come into being. Some of the considerations
which have led to this action may be stated briefly as follows:
A large part of our law is rooted in the conditions which existed
in a far simpler civilization. Owing to the introduction of
modern power machinery, the aspect of society has greatly
changed, indeed, is still changing, with great rapidity. In recent
years there has taken place-or perhaps we should say, is still
taking place-what may fairly be called a second industrial
revolution, involving not merely mass production but also mass
distribution of the products of industry. Modern methods of
transportation and communication have, for the first time in
history, mobilized the peoples of the world as well as brought
about the great concentration of human beings in our huge
cities. In America these developments have produced the "melting pot." The children of the immigrant go to our public schools
and there acquire habits, customs, and moral ideals at variance
with those which they find at home. In this way parental
authority is weakened, and with it the influence of the church.
For these reasons, and many others, the family as the fundamental social unit is undergoing great changes before our eyes.
Confronted by these and many other radical changes in social
and economic organization, our courts are more or less consciously or unconsciously struggling to adapt to the needs of the
urban, industrial civilization of today a judicial organization
and rules of law which were evolved to fit a civilization chiefly
rural and agricultural. There results necessarily not merely
uncertainty in the law and conflict of decision, but also many
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failures to meet the needs of present day society, needs which
therefore call forth much ill-considered legislation.
In the belief that the application of methods similar to those
which scientists in other fields have so fruitfully used will yield
a rich harvest in the legal field, the members of the Faculty of
the Institute have attempted to plan the work of the Institute
for the immediate future. They have assumed that the fundamental purpose of the Institute is to study as scientifically as
may be law in action; to seek to determine whether or not our
legal system is accomplishing the purposes for which it exists,
and to the extent that the conclusion is that it is not, to ascertain
both what the reasons for the failure are and what may be done
to remedy the resulting evils. Notice that a fundamental assumption is-and here recall Galileo's experiment-that the only
way to find out what anything does is to observe it in action
and not to read supposedly authoritative books about it, or to
attempt by reasoning to deduce it from fundamental principles
assumed to be fixed and given. The consequences of this assumption are that only a small part of the work of the staff
of the Institute will be with books in libraries; by far the larger
part will be concerned with the difficult, time-consuming, and
expensive task of gathering and interpreting the facts concerning the operation of our legal system.
All this is very general. Let us try to make the matter
clearer by dealing more concretely with the work now under
way at the Institute. Naturally I can do little more than outline
some of its main features in the time at my disposal.
When the Faculty of the Institute looked over the broad field
which confronted them, they were at once impressed with the
fact that in not a single state were there adequate records of
what goes on in the courts. How many cases were annually
passed upon in each of the courts of Maryland? Of other states?
What kinds of cases were these? Which kinds were causing
that congestion of litigation about which we hear so much
complaint? How long on the average did it take for each kind
of case to come to a conclusion? How long for cases tried by
juries as compared with cases in which juries were waived in
favor of court trial? In how many cases did juries disagree?
How many steps in each case did the attorney's take? To what
extent did technicalities of procedure operate to delay and obstruct justice? And so on and so on. Adequate figures were
lacking. Reformers of all kinds were advocating all kinds of
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remedies for supposed ills. No one knew the facts. Not long
ago the National Economic League took a nation-wide vote on
the relative importance of the problems confronting the American people. According to this vote the paramount problem
confronting us in this country today is the administration of
justice. Next in order came prohibition, lawlessness, crime, and
law enforcement-all phases of the same problem; with world
peace, farm relief, and taxation following in descending order.
This analysis of our contemporary ills is not reported here as
being sound, but merely with a view to pointing out that adequate judicial records and statistics are lacking by means of
which the correctness of the diagnosis can be tested. The Institute therefore approached its problem in the spirit of the remark
of Mr. Justice Holmes, to the effect "most even of the enlightened reformers that I hear or read seem to me . . . to become
rhetorical just when I want figures."
How get the figures-that was the problem, or better one
of the problems, confronting the Institute. It was not an official
body; it had no power to invade the offices of clerks of court
and demand the collection of the needed data. At the critical
moment there appeared in Baltimore the Chairman of the Judicial Council of one of our leading states-Ohio. As you doubtless all know, a growing realization of the need for improving
the administration of justice has led to the establishment of
Judicial Councils in over one-third of the States. These councils
are charged with the duty of studying the judicial system of
the states, their organization, operation, and effects, and of
recommending to the legislatures needed improvements. These
Judicial Councils, as you doubtless also know, are composed
of members of the Bench and Bar whose time is fully occupied
by their daily work as judges and practicing lawyers. They
thus lack the time and energy needed for the kind of work
which must be done if dependable facts are to be gathered and
interpreted. In addition, in most of the states they are not
provided with the funds needed to employ a staff which might
act as a fact-finding agency for them. The need for just such
a fact-finding agency was obvious. It seemed clear to the
Faculty of the Institute that here was precisely the opportunity
for which they were looking, and accordingly they welcomed
the suggestion of the Ohio Judicial Council that they cooperate
with that Council in its work. In this way the Institute became
for the time being the fact-finding or research agency of the
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Judicial Council of Ohio. A little later the Governor of Maryland and the President of its Judicial Council made a similar
suggestion for a study in that state. This invitation the Institute also eagerly accepted, as, if its studies were to be really
useful, it would be necessary to have comparable figures from
two, or preferably, several states. Lack of funds has, alas,
prevented the Institute from responding to tentative suggestions
from other states of cooperation with the Councils in those
states, as is desirable, indeed almost necessary, if worth while
figures are to be secured. It is hoped that with the improvement
in business conditions, which is perhaps even now beginning,
these further steps in the development of the Institute's program
can be taken. In the meantime it is carrying forward, so far
as it can with the limited funds at its disposal, state wide studies
in the administration of justice in Ohio and Maryland. Curiously enough this more or less accidental selection of states for
study has given us two states which differ markedly, both in
economic and social conditions and in the systems of legal procedure. For example, Ohio has code procedure, with its socalled fusion of common law and equity; Maryland has substantially common law procedure, with (in Baltimore) separate
courts of common law and equity, or (in the counties of Maryland) with law and equity cases kept distinct, using substantially common law pleading on the law side and equity pleading
in equity cases.
First, as to the administrative organization of these studies:
in each state the direct administration of the study is carried
on by a small number of directors. In Ohio this consists of
four persons: the Chairman of the Judicial Council, who is also
Chief Justice of the State; a representative of the State Bar
Association, and two members of the Faculty of the Institute.
In Maryland, the directors are two in number: the President
of the Judicial Council, who again is also Chief Justice and one
member of the Faculty of the Institute. In both states the Bar
Associations have appointed cooperating committees. In both
states steps have been taken to enlist the cooperation of the
faculties of the local schools of law, departments of government
and other fields of social science, as well as those in charge of
research organizations of all kinds in fields related to law and
its administration.
The next problem which confronted us was, of course, the
selection of the points of attack. We were planning a compre-
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hensive, thoroughgoing, state wide study in each state, to occupy
from three to five years. What facts should we gather first,
and how should we gather them? Our thinking centered about
the lack of adequate records and statistics of what goes on in
court. These must first be supplied; and-we concluded-some
plan must be worked out whereby a permanent system of such
records and statistics could be offered for adoption. Obviously
the clerks of the various courts occupy in this field the strategic
position. Fortunately in Ohio, in which we first began our work,
the Statute creating the Judicial Council specifically provides
that the clerks of the various courts shall give the Judicial
Council such information as the Council may call for. We therefore prepared what we call data sheets, one of which was to be
filled out by the clerk for each case as it went through the court
in question. You will find samples of these data sheets in the
pamphlets which have been distributed. (Of course the actual
sheets are much larger than the reproductions of them in the
pamphlet.) In Ohio we began our study with civil cases in the
courts of general original jurisdiction-the Courts of Common
Pleas--excluding from our first sheet the divorce and alimony
cases, as requiring separate treatment. The study began January 2d, 1930. As each case was filed, the clerk started a sheet,
completing it as the case came to a conclusion in that court,
and sending in all completed blanks on the first of every month.
This first series covers all cases filed for the first six months
of last year. Beginning on July 1st similar sheets were begun
for all divorce and alimony cases, and all criminal cases, instituted during the second six months of the year.
The Maryland study was started six months later, and is
following similar lines. In both states studies have also been
started of the work of other courts, such as the municipal courts
of Columbus and Cleveland; of the Peoples Court of Baltimore
City (the small claims court), of the magistrates courts, of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, etc., etc.
Most persons who see these data sheets think them much
more formidable than they really are. One supposedly intelligent critic reported that we were "asking hundreds of questions
about each case." Nothing could be farther from the truth. If
you will examine one of the sheets you will see that the appearance of complexity is due to the fact that we have written
down all possible answers to the questions we are asking of
the clerks. For example, on the Maryland Common Law blank
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under Origin of Case-one question, be it noted-are listed
ten possible answers, only one of which can be given. All the
clerk does in answering is to check with a cross the appropriate
answer. The bank actually therefore asks about twenty or
twenty-five questions about each case.
Can the clerks fill these blanks out? We were told they
could not, even if willing. Our answer has been: We do not
know. We are going to find out. Many of the items we were
reasonably sure every clerk could answer if he would; others
were more doubtful. Now that a large number of blanks are
in we are having field workers re-check samples in each county,
and where the margin of error is too large, all the blanks in that
county. One of our first investigations, therefore, has to do
with what kinds of data clerks of court in Ohio and Maryland
can and will keep accurately-a very important item of information if we are to look forward to the introduction of an
improved and adequate system of judicial records and statistics.
At the same time we are obtaining data which are going to
enable us to make, we hope, the first state wide analysis ever
made in this country of the current operations of a judicial
system as a whole.
If you will glance once more at one of these data sheets, you
will see that all the items are numbered. These numbers correspond to columns on a statistical card, and to the numbers in the
columns. After the sheets have been checked for accuracy, the
data on them are transferred to the statistical cards, by punching in each column the appropriate number. Then by means
of automatic sorting machines an accurate count can be made
of the number of answers of each kind to each question asked.
In addition, a basis is furnished for careful studies of particular
problems, as by means of the cards it is possible to determine
the exact location of'every case of a certain kind for the period
covered by the study. For example: In Maryland a large percentage of the cases at common law are "confession" cases,
judgment being entered by the clerk of court on the basis of a
"judgment note." There has been considerable discussion at
times of this system and of possible abuses, as well as argument
-even holdings in some states-that the notes violate the usury
law. No study of the actual operation of the system has, so
far as I know, ever been made. Our data sheets will, we expect,
enable the first steps in such a study to be made cheaply and
expeditiously. The names of parties and attorneys, docket num-
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bers, county where judgment was entered, etc., in all such cases
can be ascertained with little labor; also the amount of the judgment. Field workers with relatively small expense will be able
to find out to what extent these judgments are paid; or if not
paid, enforced by execution. Other data could be obtained. I
am merely suggesting, rather than completely outlining, the
kind of study possible.
Merely to gather these data sheets, code them and transfer
them to the statistical cards, requires a large expenditure of
time and money. In Ohio alone annually more than half a
million cases are tried, covering criminal cases, divorce cases,
business cases, juvenile cases, etc. In sampling these, we hope
adequately we shall secure perhaps 30,000 business cases, 11,000
divorce cases, 12,000 criminal cases, 25,000 cases in the municipal
courts, 3,000 in the Appellate Courts, 1,300 in the Supreme
Court, without mentioning probate courts, justices of the peace,
and the administrative commissions. If to this you add the
more concrete studies of individual problems and of the social
and economic situations out of which the litigation arises, you
gain some idea of the size of the task we have undertaken.
It is our hope to get, first of all, masses of objective data
from each state, in such form that the data from one state can
be compared with those in the other-or others if later we are
able to work in still other jurisdictions. Secondly, we hope
these data will be sufficiently representative of the underlying
situations so that significant and important conclusions can be
reached as to the working of the legal system in these states.
Thirdly, we hope that we shall be able to interpret our figures
so that their meaning will stand out, their significance appear.
Figures in and of themselves do not mean anything; they merely
fill columns in useless tables of statistics. I am frequently asked,
what do you expect your figures to show? My answer is that
I do not know. If I knew that a large part of our work would
be done. In scientific work more often than not the scientist
knows only at the end whether the facts he has collected have
a meaning or significance, and if so, what it is. This is not to
say that he collects facts entirely at random; certainly not.
But often his choice follows what the man in the street calls a
"hunch" and the philosopher "trained intuition." In a new
field, such as that of the Institute perhaps "hunch" would be the
better term.
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It is our hope that during the coming year some of the first
fruits of our labors will be available. In order to expedite this,
in Maryland we have conducted our divorce study entirely by
means of field workers, which enable us to go back and take the
year 1929, i. e., to collect the facts about cases already closed.
The data for Baltimore City are all in and are being analyzed;
those from the counties will soon be in. We have also taken by
means of field workers three samples, two each of one month,
and one of six weeks, of the small claims court (the Peoples
Court) in Baltimore City-the court which takes the place of
the justices of the peace in civil litigation. These data are now
being coded and transferred to the statistical cards, and in the
fall we hope to find out what we can make of our figures. We
have completed tentative drafts of studies of the expenditures
of public money in the administration of justice in both Ohio
and Maryland. These drafts are being submitted to advisory
experts-accountants, statisticians, and others-for criticism
and suggestion. They will then be revised and published.
We have under way a complete study of the work of the
Public Utility Commission of Maryland, and a similar study in
Ohio; and other concrete studies which I have not time to mention. We propose to take time enough in all these to make as
sure as is humanly possible both that our data are reliable and
that they at least allow of the interpretation we place upon
them. For this reason it is to be expected that the output of
the Institute in its early years will not be large. We believe
we have had enough of superficial surveys and suggestions for
reform. We hope not to add to their number.
A year ago, speaking before the Maryland Bar Association,
my colleague, Dr. Leon C. Marshall, thus summed up the objectives of these state wide studies:
"1. To study the trends of litigation and to ascertain its
human causes and effects.
"2. To study the machinery and the functioning of the
various agencies and offices which directly and indirectly have
to do with the administration of law.
"3. To learn reasons for delays, expense and uncertainty in
litigation.
"4. To institute a permanent system of judicial records
and statistics which will -provide automatically information now
secured after great labor.
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"5. To detect the points at which changes in substantive
law would contribute markedly to social justice.
"6. To do all this in close co-operation with the practical
workers in the field and to turn the results over to practical
administrators for utilization."
Before I close, may I add that the Institute is in no sense
a reformatory body, nor does it intend to engage in propaganda.
It does hope to be able to present from year to year scientific
studies, setting forth what the staff of the Institute believes to
be the facts relevant to the particular part of our legal system
-or possibly of some foreign system-under investigation, and
to indicate the bearing of these facts upon attempts to improve
the administration of justice. We hope that the Judicial Councils and those who are charged with the duty of legislating or
of recommending legislation may find these studies helpful in
their attempts to improve our legal system.
In closing, let me bespeak your co-operation in the work of
the Institute. If our efforts are to accomplish their purposes,
we shall need constantly not only the sympathetic understanding
but the active aid and support of those who are engaged from
day to day in the administration of our law.

